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12 June 1993

Neil Gallagher, FBI

The attached memorandum is being disseminated to put on the record at the Secret level the evidence regarding Iraqi culpability for the assassination plot against President Bush in April 1993. The memorandum is consistent with the DCI's report to the President on the matter.

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Directorate of Intelligence	
ntelligence Memorandum Counterterrorist Center	

Iraq: Baghdad Attempts to Assassinate Former President Bush

Summary

12 July 1993

The evidence currently available allows us to draw a confident analytic conclusion that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn directed his intelligence service to assassinate former President Bush during Mr. Bush's visit to Kuwait on 14-16 April. This memorandum briefly outlines the evidence on which this conclusion rests and explains why we believe that the alternative scenarios against which the evidence was tested are implausible.



This memorandum was prepared by

Counterterrorist Center, and has been coordinated within the CIA.

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to C/CTC/
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Sources of Evidence

The evidence on which our conclusion is based comes from three sources:

•	Forensic examinations by U.S. Government technical experts of equipment and explosi devices	ve
	FBI interviews of the 16 suspects	
	Intelligence reporting from human sources.	

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Forensics

The forensic evidence in this case is based primarily on the FBI's examination of the explosive devices acquired in Kuwait: a car bomb and several smaller "cube bombs." The FBI conducted a detailed forensic comparison of these devices with two Iraqi devices that had been recovered elsewhere in the Middle East in early 1991 during the Persian Gulf conflict. The FBI has reported the following results:

- The same person, or persons of close association, constructed the remote-control fusing systems in the Kuwait car bomb and in the two other known Iraqi devices.
- The person, or persons of close association, responsible for the additional wiring and components associated with another known Iraqi radio-controlled car bomb was also responsible for the additional wiring and components associated with the radio-controlled car bomb recovered in Kuwait.
- The results of chemical and physical analyses of the explosive main charge from the car bomb recovered in Kuwait indicate an explosive known as PE-4A. According to the FBI Laboratory Explosive Unit, PE-4A plastic explosive was contained in terrorist improvised explosive devices used by Iraqi operatives in early 1991 in Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila.
- The results of the chemical and physical analyses of samples from two of the 10 cube-shaped explosive devices recovered in Kuwait are consistent with explosive material taken from an Iraqi car bomb recovered in the Middle East in 1991.

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Interviews

The FBI's interviews of the suspects arrested by Kuwaiti authorities produced the following information:

- The two main suspects--Iraqi nationals named al-Asadi and al-Ghazali--said they received orders in early April from individuals they believed to be associated with the IIS to carry out a bombing operation in Kuwait and were given explosive material and instructions on its use. The Iraqi recruiters provided the plan, training, and material for the operation.
- The suspect al-Ghazali told the FBI on 13 May that a person who identified himself as Abu Rafid recruited him on 9 April to assassinate former President Bush.
- The suspect al-Asadi said a person known to him as Muhammed Jawad recruited him on 10 April and later instructed him to transport explosives to Kuwait and guide al-Ghazali to Kuwait University. He told the FBI that al-Ghazali told him of the plot against Mr. Bush after the operation began. (Al-Asadi's recruiter was described by al-Ghazali as the individual who assisted Abu Rafid to prepare him for the mission to assassinate President Bush.)

Intelligence Reporting	
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Testing Other Scenarios

In conducting our inquiry, we tested the foregoing evidence against three other scenarios and concluded that none of these alternatives is plausible.

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